Anyone familiar with the Houthis and their decades-long evolving relationship with Iran knows that decisions on how to respond to the recent attacks on Houthi infrastructure by the United States and its allies depend on Houthi leader Abdul -We know it is not in Malik al-Houthi's hands. . It would simply be his or his comrade's advisory opinion.
Therefore, the discussion should focus on Iran's expected response. The United States recognizes that its attacks on Houthi-held areas in Yemen are not actually suppressive attacks, but rather send a message. It's about letting the main sponsor know that there are targets that can be bombed by Operation Prosperity Guardian Coalition.
More importantly, the Biden administration wants to reaffirm its resolve to defend its policies and positions and demonstrate that it is willing to use force if necessary. In the past, this has been questioned not only by Iran but by all of Washington's allies in the Middle East without exception.
The will to war remains a deterrent, as attacks on military headquarters and bases may be ineffective. These attacks could be directed against strategic and important facilities and heads of power, whether by the Houthis or other groups. The US government now wants to pursue a true carrot-and-stick policy.
The stick may be effective these days, but the carrot is no longer of use to the Iranians given their nuclear program and regional impact. Rather, it is simply “damage control” – not taking action against Iranian proxies and preventing Israel from taking military action against them.
It must be recognized that the Iranian-backed Houthis do not actually want direct confrontation with Israel or the US coalition. But they have no intention of giving up the publicity and political benefits they have gained by announcing that they will shell ships and naval vessels bound for Israel in support of the Palestinian people.
Therefore, the Houthis will continue to play this fruitless game as long as they can act as a rival not only to Israel but also to major international powers. Allied attacks on Houthi bases in Yemen are certainly not enough to stop Houthi operations in the Red Sea.
Iran has an opportunity to test the Biden administration's resolve and ability to escalate the ongoing conflict in Gaza, especially given the non-agreement of US regional allies, especially Saudi Arabia, to opening a new regional front in Yemen. is still left.Iran plays a complex regional game
It is possible that the Houthis may indeed resume attacks on ships, and perhaps step up attacks on US and British naval forces. This is a highly propaganda war game, part of a complex game of regional and international card shuffling orchestrated by Iran.
The aim is to usher in new agreed security measures on maritime routes and give Iran and its proxies leverage commensurate with the threat they pose to global security. Indeed, the US and UK operations against the Houthis open the door to a variety of scenarios.
However, to maintain objectivity, it is necessary to recognize that the Houthis are leaving no choice in the matter. Issues that threaten the security of vital shipping lanes such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait cannot simply be ignored. There is no justification for continuing to threaten ships in the Strait or the Red Sea, even if the aim is to demand an end to the fighting in Gaza.
Such actions have a negative impact, distracting attention from what is happening in the Palestinian territories and undermining international sympathy for Palestinian civilian victims. The protection of just cause does not apply by unlawful means or by harm to others, as in the case of attacks on ships or international commerce based solely on the suspicion that the ship belongs to Israel or has an Israeli owner. Unachievable.
Iran has placed itself in a strategically difficult and highly complex position by allowing proxies to open all fronts at once. Even if the escalation by these proxies is very carefully calculated, as in the case of Houthi attacks, it poses a threat to both Israel and the world.
As a result, Iran faces a potentially catastrophic scenario that could destroy all of its regional proxies at once, or at least eliminate their ability to exercise power and influence. This could force Iran to intervene directly to protect its large investments in these proxies, given that the fate of the Iranian regime is highly tied to the fate of these proxies.
This would force the Iranian government into a scenario it has long sought to avoid: an open and direct war with a strategic adversary. This will come at a time when we cannot wait for an international position to calm potential conflicts. Relations between China and the United States have deteriorated, but Beijing prefers not to get involved in ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, as evidenced by its response to the Gaza war. In addition, Russia may not be able to provide diplomatic or military support to its ally Iran.
There is also optimism that an escalation of the conflict can be avoided because the United States relies on the Iranian regime's pragmatism and continued tendency to defend its interests when threatened.
Therefore, Washington continues to send indirect signals to Iran through proxies to avoid fanning the flames of a regional conflagration that is difficult to control.
The author is a political analyst in the United Arab Emirates and a former candidate for the Federal Council of State.