The first year of the Ukraine war seemed to vindicate Russian hawks. The belief that Vladimir Putin is a cautious chess player and that his ambitions can be limited by negotiations, support from an already strained America because Ukraine cannot plausibly defend itself from Moscow Beliefs that Putin was unworthy of the war, these thoughts led Putin to gamble and rant during the first months of the war, until the Ukrainian military pushed back the troops.
The second year of the war was kind to realists and doves. As in many previous wars, Russia appears to be stronger in a violent conflict than in an initial offensive. Putin’s government has proven resilient both to the economic weapons of the West and to domestic opposition. The death in prison of Russia’s leading dissident Alexei Navalny appears to be the latest example of the ruthless liquidation of dictators. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s counterattack in the spring and summer ended in failure. A year ago there were still hopes that the Russian withdrawal would turn into a rout, but a stalemate has dominated the front ever since.
The changing situation is creating cracks in the hawkish debate, as evidenced by the U.S. Congress’ fight over additional aid to Ukraine. Meanwhile, there’s still rhetoric from the first year of the war that insists Putin is clearly losing the war (“This guy is on life support,” said Tom, Republican of North Carolina). -Senator Tillis told colleagues (in a Senate debate) that he argues that aid to Ukraine is a cheap and effective way to undermine and defeat America’s rivals without fighting Russia. .
On the other, the tide is turning against Ukraine, Putin is getting stronger (“Russia’s military equipment production capacity is increasing significantly,” the Danish Defense Minister recently warned), and Putin is They are making arguments that suggest they are ready to attack. I will go to the Baltics or other NATO countries soon. A bizarre incident at the Capitol, where Rep. Mike Turner, an Ohio Republican and Ukraine hawk, teased classified information about a Russian superweapon in space feels like an attempt to spice up this narrative. – Regarding the transfer of funds and arms to Ukraine, which emphasizes Russia’s growing power as a reason to maintain it.
The problem with the first argument is that it is not consistent with the changing situation on the ground. The problem with the second argument is that it raises major strategic questions. If Russia has only gotten stronger since we started funding the war in Ukraine, as critics have warned, that suggests we may have pushed ourselves too far after all. is not it?
I think there is a good example of continuing aid to Ukraine without exaggerating Ukraine’s successes or overhyping Russia’s military-industrial complex. But this is a difficult case to adjudicate under the broad conditions that have framed aid to Ukraine to date.
Ostensibly as a concession to skeptics, the bill passed by the Senate includes a provision requiring the Biden administration to submit to Congress a detailed strategic plan explaining how aid will “hasten Ukraine’s victory.” It is included. But as the New Yorker’s Keith Gessen modestly puts it, at this point most military observers have “a little difficulty explaining Ukraine’s actual military victory.” Rather, it is more likely that there is no plausible path to complete victory for Ukraine, or at least no path that is compatible with protecting other US interests around the world.
In other words, we are not giving money to Ukraine. In other words, they believe that there is a high possibility that Russia will be pushed back to the pre-war Line of Control. Rather, the primary reason for continuing to send aid is to facilitate the negotiation of a ceasefire on terms favorable to Ukraine’s survival and resilience—because if we are seen as abandoning the Ukrainians in advance, This is because such conditions become increasingly disadvantageous.
I hope and believe that this is what the White House is currently seeking under its wartime rhetoric: the best possible agreement to end the war, not an outright victory. And if that’s your goal, there are certainly reasons you don’t want to say it openly. Even if you’re actually ready to negotiate, you’ll want to look like you’re planning on winning.
But the Biden administration has a domestic audience as well as an international audience, and unless the current aid package is presented as a decisive blow to Russia’s defeat, it will have a hard time convincing domestic skeptics, especially shaky House Republicans. may be easy. In reality, there is no evidence that is the key to a resounding victory, where previous investments have clearly failed.
These days, such a promise — Victory is around the corner! Victory awaits your next attack! — evokes memories of Afghanistan and Vietnam more than confidence in America’s strategic capabilities. What we need instead is something more subtle. It’s a public argument that doesn’t compromise too much on Russian aggression, but enough on military realities to convince Americans that they are making investments that will actually help end the conflict.