Last month’s gruesome Boeing 737 MAX cabin explosion caused the biggest shake-up in aviation safety priorities in decades, but some plans for fundamental change could backfire. is inevitable.
For the first time in the modern jet age, Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration publicly advocated the use of independent third-party inspectors to monitor aircraft manufacturers’ assembly lines. The goal is to identify and correct critical (potentially fatal) manufacturing errors. Boeing is under siege from angry travelers and airlines around the world as the FAA, beleaguered by a recent spate of production errors, scrambles to restore confidence in its quality controls.
Outsourcing key parts of the FAA’s inspection powers amounts to a shrewd short-term public relations strategy and signals the White House’s determination to take a hard line. However, from the original person’s perspective, wall street journal That approach is unlikely to significantly improve quality oversight at the factory level, according to a reporter who has covered civil aviation safety for more than 30 years.
“The current system is not working. It’s not providing safe aircraft,” FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker recently told lawmakers. He also said Boeing’s repeated failures may require bringing in a nonprofit group to “provide a fresh set of eyes.” Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun, who appointed a new quality control chief last week, predicts increased oversight from new outside experts Boeing has hired. It’s that simple. ”
Such harsh comments would have been unthinkable before the 737 MAX accident in January. But safety experts say relying on a limited number of independent inspectors to scrutinize routine manufacturing compliance is a short-sighted and misguided solution. Instead, they argue, the focus should be on significantly increasing voluntary reporting from Boeing employees to accurately identify manufacturing defects.
Unless more line workers speak up, knowing they can admit mistakes with impunity, long-term results will likely be ineffective and even counterproductive.
According to the FAA, this type of non-punitive behavior by pilots and controllers is a key reason that U.S. airlines have been able to transport nearly 12 billion passengers since 2009 without a single fatal jetliner accident. approach.
When it comes to production, much of Boeing’s woes stem from undisciplined outsourcing. Employing teams of non-FAA inspectors with no institutional knowledge to monitor work performed by suppliers could further undermine the FAA’s standing with foreign safety regulators.
For example, Europe is already challenging the FAA’s leadership in overseeing drones. Assessing the risks of enhanced cockpit automation. Drafting standards for single pilot airliners.
From a practical standpoint, safety experts worry that attracting the necessary number of experienced external inspectors will be difficult, time-consuming and expensive. The FAA has never attempted anything on this scale with a nonprofit partner in recent memory, but nothing appears to be being done at this time to lay the groundwork for a major effort.
More importantly, a sudden pivot to hire new personnel on a large scale would divert FAA resources and attention essential to an improved, more proactive, data-based safety management system. These internal development efforts have long been mandated by government agencies, but are moving more slowly than expected.
The debate fueled by the Congressional hearing will go far beyond the current high-profile production errors. The rhetoric is expected to intensify in the coming weeks as a committee set up by Congress releases findings criticizing existing federal oversight as inadequate.
“The FAA is thinking outside the box because the knowledge and experience they have may not be sufficient to address the current crisis,” said one member of the Blue Ribbon Committee. Ta. The agency has the authority to promptly implement the panel’s recommendations.
In a sharp change from the past, several airline executives publicly criticized Boeing, with some vowing to send their own factory inspectors. The company welcomed this initiative.
Until the recent controversy, manufacturing defects were not at the top of the list of imminent flight risks. In fact, since the 1990s, manufacturing defects have not been specifically mentioned in rankings of causes of airliner fatalities.
Historically, operational hazards such as pilot fatigue, cockpit errors, automation failures, and traffic controller distraction have been considered the most important safety risks, followed by flawed engineering design. It was being done. These include an explosion-prone fuel tank on a Boeing 747 jumbo jet in 1996, a smoldering battery on a 787 jet in 2013, and a software flaw that crashed two 737 MAX jets a few years later. .
In contrast, assembly line errors were generally considered infrequent, dangerous, and ultimately put on the back burner.
Now that dynamic has completely switched. The door-sized hole that suddenly caused the cabin to depressurize on Alaska Airlines’ 737 MAX 9 plane has sparked calls for more reform than any other U.S. commercial accident in at least the past 20 years. There were no casualties and the fleet returned to flight. But Boeing is showing humility, and the usual combativeness of its senior executives is gone. Company leaders no longer resist increased testing or complain about the cost of technological fixes. A few days ago, Boeing replaced the factory manager who was vice president of the 737 MAX program, and also reorganized the production and quality control leadership for the entire airliner.
Nevertheless, skepticism remains over Boeing’s repeated assurances of a comprehensive solution.
Texas Republican Sen. Ted Cruz’s tone in describing Boeing’s tattered reputation reflects the surprise of many. Once passengers board the plane, he quipped after the explosion, “passengers expect the door to stay open.”
To restore trust, FAA and Boeing leaders need to explain the logic of quality control changes and make clear commitments to implement them. Helena Lydemar Cunningham, senior safety leader for the International Pilots Union, made that broader point at a Flight Safety Foundation conference in Paris a few weeks before the 737 MAX crash. “If safety culture doesn’t start in the boardroom, it doesn’t start at all,” she argued.
Andy Pastor spent 40 years covering the U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Defense, space and civil aviation for The Wall Street Journal before retiring in 2021 to write a book on the history of aviation safety.
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