Opinion: What Iran wants and fears

Editor’s note: Hussein Ibish is a senior resident researcher. Arab Gulf States Research Institute, Washington. His latest book is “What’s wrong with the one-state policy? Why is ending the occupation and making peace with Israel still the Palestinian national goal?” The views expressed in this commentary are his own.read more CNN opinion.

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The crises gripping the Middle East are both independent flashpoints and relatively integrated region-wide attacks by Iranian-backed militant groups.

In some cases, it is unclear how much control Iran has over militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen and elsewhere.

Iran’s influence extends beyond the earthquakes and tremors that shake the region, but like the Biden administration, Iran is serious about avoiding widespread war.

Both are like Goldilocks: just enough, but not too much.

However, there are important differences. The United States is a status quo powerhouse, and maintaining security and stability is its regional brand. The 2003 invasion of Iraq shattered America’s credibility, in part because it was a highly irrational departure from its commitment to the traditional order.

On the contrary, Iran is a classic revisionist, opposed to regional and global balances of power.

The United States and Saudi Arabia are also regional status quo powers with strong ties, while Iran consistently aligns with other revisionist powers such as Russia and China.

This means that, as with the Saudi-led Arab intervention in Yemen that began in 2015 and Israel’s ongoing war of revenge in Gaza, U.S. interests must be jeopardized unless partners act relatively cautiously. This would put the US government at a tactical disadvantage.

That is why the Biden administration is quietly trying to contain and restrain Israel in the Gaza Strip and prevent it from acting on its threats against Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

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Conversely, Iran is usually not threatened by disruptions caused by its clients. For Iran, even the Hamas-led massacre on October 7 served as a beneficial outcome, spilling blood on Israel in a war with Hamas’s on-again, off-again allies.

However, Iran must be careful about the actions of its proxies. When Kataib Hezbollah, one of Iran’s Iraqi Shiite militias, launched a drone attack on a US logistics center in Jordan earlier this year, killing three US soldiers, it went too far. Iranian leaders panicked and insisted they did not want a widespread war, especially with the United States. Kataib Hezbollah announced it would halt all military operations while complaining that Iran “does not know the true nature of our jihad,” meaning it will not follow Iranian orders.

Iran has supported Hezbollah’s efforts to avoid an all-out war with Israel, despite consistent escalations and threats by Israel. This year, when Israel assassinated key Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in a drone strike on Beirut, a major Hezbollah stronghold, Hezbollah retaliated with a largely symbolic rocket attack on an Israeli radar station. No one was injured and there was little damage.

Israel responded by assassinating Wissam Tawil, the second-in-command of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan unit, but there has been virtually no retaliation, although violent skirmishes continue along the border.

Israel is now demanding that Hezbollah withdraw its troops 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) from its border or face an all-out attack, with around 80,000 Israelis and 70,000 Lebanese killed. There are evacuations on both sides. Hezbollah refused, and Washington negotiator Amos Hochstein offered Hezbollah a 7-kilometer (4.3-mile) withdrawal. Hezbollah does not want war with Israel, and Iran agrees.

Tehran is unwilling to waste its trump card: Hezbollah’s 150,000 precision-guided missiles and rockets in Gaza and Hamas. Hezbollah, perhaps the most powerful non-state military in history, aims to deter an Israeli or American attack on Iran, especially its nuclear facilities.

The possibility of such an airstrike by the United States or Israel is one of the most important reasons why Iran wants to avoid a widespread conflict. As the world’s attention focuses on the immediate crisis created by the October 7 attacks, the Iranian government is making a secret but significant move toward becoming a nuclear-weapon state by enriching ever more near-weapons-grade uranium. We are making progress.

What Iran needs most is something that could reverse this progress and threaten other core national interests.

The wild cards for Iran are Yemen’s Houthi militants and Red Sea piracy. This piracy means that Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” network must be included in a de facto maritime security agreement, and that if Iran cannot freely transport oil due to sanctions, no one will be able to control Iranian diplomacy. This reiterates the long-standing points mentioned above. We can also guarantee infringement-free maritime commerce.

Three of the world’s eight major maritime chokepoints, the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, encircle the Arabian Peninsula and are vulnerable to attacks from Iran and the Axis powers. This global economic vulnerability gives Iran compelling international influence. .

However, the Houthis may well prove to be Iran’s most troublesome Axis member. Like Hamas, but unlike almost all other Axis groups, both are clients of Iran rather than its creation. Both have shown the ability and willingness to act alone, as Hamas almost certainly did on October 7th.

Iran is therefore at great risk in a series of conflicts that need to be carefully contained and controlled to avoid paying significant, perhaps huge, costs.

The Iranian government already has Iraqi proxies in custody, helping Hezbollah collapse and avoid a devastating Israeli attack. Both countries may even accept, formally or unofficially, an American proposal for a more modest withdrawal from the border with Israel. And Iran will likely want the Houthis to be very careful not to kill Americans or go too far.

Washington is not alone in having to play a careful balancing game in the quagmire of the Middle East. Even though Iran is hostile to the status quo and benefits from the current conflict at virtually no cost to itself, it clearly recognizes that significant potential risks are growing. .

The Iranian government certainly recognizes the need to better manage its Arab proxies. Failure to do so would drag Iran into a conflict that would be disastrous for its national interests and perhaps the future of the regime.